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Introduction 
 
 
Food Standards in Trade Agreements 
Differing Regulatory Traditions in the EU and the US and Tips for the TTIP 
Bettina Rudloff 
The European Union is both the largest exporter and importer of agricultural prod-
ucts in the world. Its major trading partners are the United States, Argentina, Brazil, 
Russia, and China. This trade in agricultural products is influenced by a number of 
political measures. In addition to tariffs, trade in foodstuffs is increasingly influenced 
by so-called nontariff measures (NTMs), among which are threshold values for pesticide 
residues, production standards, and packing- and labeling standards. In fact, such meas-
ures can impact the costs of trade much more than tariffs. Reducing these NTMs within 
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) offers enormous prospects 
for economic growth. 
 
The European public is concerned that the 
TTIP could undermine EU standards and 
that Europe will soon be importing “chlo-
ride poultry” and “hormone beef,” both of 
which have been banned in the EU. Is a race 
to the bottom inevitable? Will Europe be 
forced to adopt US standards? And are these 
really worse than European standards? 
Trade in Agriculture: 
A Classic Trade Conflict 
Overall, transatlantic agricultural trade is 
economically unimportant and has been 
declining over the last 20 years. Its current 
share of total EU-US trade in goods is about 
5 percent. However, it is of utmost impor-
tance for the EU agricultural sector: the 
United States is the main importer of EU 
agricultural products, whereas the EU only 
ranks number five among US export mar-
kets for agriculture. Both actors are highly 
protectionist about their agricultural 
markets. 
 Tariffs for industrial products average 
4 percent in the European Union (US: 3 per-
cent) but average 13 percent for agricultur-
al products (US: 4.7 percent). And tariffs for 
strategically important products are even 
higher: average EU tariffs on milk products 
are 50 percent, and for individual products 
about 600 percent (US: 20 percent; tariffs 
peak at 95 percent). 
 Tariff effects of (“tariff equivalent”) non-
tariff measures (NTMs) are very difficult to 
estimate, ranging from 20 to 57 percent for 
the EU and from 17 to more than 70 per-
cent for the United States. Despite being 
considered a rather liberal economic actor 
in terms of tariffs, the United States does 
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not use these measures any less than the 
EU does. 
Because the level of protection via NTMs 
is very high, experts expect large economic 
gains in the agricultural sector if they were 
to be removed: most estimates arrive at 
significant growth in agricultural trade of 
about 20 percent. With potential growth 
of up to 400 percent, EU exports of animal 
products are expected to benefit the most. 
Negotiations on agricultural products 
often reveal critical issues for trade agree-
ments in general: not only do they touch 
on sensitive consumer interests, but also 
the interests of the well-organized agricul-
tural lobbies. The Uruguay Round, which 
took place between 1986 and 1994 and cul-
minated in the establishment of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), nearly failed 
because of a conflict over oil seeds. Even the 
last round of the Doha Ministerial Confer-
ence at the end of 2013 could only be com-
pleted with major concession for Indian 
food subsidies. Many existing agreements 
explicitly exclude the agricultural sector: 
agricultural products are either exempt 
from market access or the negotiating par-
ties agree to slowly phase-out tariffs. Cases 
in point are the customs union with Turkey 
and the Euro-Mediterranean Association 
Agreements; even the European Economic 
Area, which includes EU and European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA) states, contains 
special rules on agriculture. 
WTO Rules for Food Safety 
States cannot arbitrarily set rules. Member 
states of the WTO have to adhere to certain 
rules of the game. 
 The General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) is based on the notion of free-
market access, which applies equally to all 
states (Art. I). Rules for importers should 
not be stricter than for domestic producers 
(Art. III). Quantitative trade restrictions are 
explicitly banned (Art. XI). However, there 
are exceptions to all of these rules if justi-
fied by protecting human, animal, or plant 
health (Art. XX [b]). 
 The agreement on Sanitary and Phyto-
sanitary measures (SPS agreement) grants 
states the right to make sovereign decisions 
on national safety standards (Art. 2). At 
the same time, it refers to the adherence 
to international standards, such as those 
of the Codex Alimentarius Commission of 
the World Health Organization and the UN 
Food and Agriculture Organization; the 
International Plant Protection Convention; 
and the World Organization for Animal 
Health (Art. 3). Stricter standards need to be 
justified by scientific risk assessment (Art. 5). 
Equivalence as Alternative to 
Harmonization 
If harmonization in terms of identical stand-
ards is not achievable, the WTO recommends 
equivalence: if different standards achieve 
the same safety outcome, then they should 
be mutually accepted (Art. 4 SPS). Such 
mutual recognition is the result of complex 
conformity assessments and can either 
apply to individual standards or the full 
institutional system for setting standards. 
This means cost-savings despite different 
standards and thereby commercial advan-
tages, because expensive quality assessments 
and border controls can be removed. These 
savings can constitute more than a third of 
the product price, as in the case of Moroc-
can tomato exports to the EU. 
The Sinner:  
The EU in the Dock of the WTO 
The interpretation of WTO law is mostly 
done through WTO dispute settlements. 
Only 10 percent of all WTO cases refer to 
food safety. The EU has participated in a 
third of these. Often, the United States is 
the opposing party. 
At the end of the 1980s, the United 
States and Canada accused the EU in the 
“Beef Hormone Dispute” because it had 
banned the import of American and Cana-
dian beef. Growth hormones are banned 
in the EU because they are considered to 
cause cancer. As the EU could not prove 
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this causality through a WTO-accepted risk 
assessment, it was convicted in 1998. As 
the EU continued the ban, the United States 
and Canada were granted penalty tariffs 
on European products up to a value of 120 
million US dollars. It was not until 2009 
that the dispute was finally resolved. The EU 
offered tariff-free quotas for hormone-free 
premium beef from Canada and the United 
States. In return, the United States and 
Canada lifted their penalty tariffs. 
In a dispute on genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs), the United States, 
Canada, and Argentina sued the EU in 2003 
for a moratorium on approvals it had im-
posed five years ago, which was equivalent 
to a market access ban for these states. The 
EU was convicted in 2006 and lifted the 
ban. However, till today actually only one 
type of genetically modified maize has been 
produced in just five European countries 
(Spain, Portugal, Czech Republic, Slovenia, 
and Romania). Yet, the European Food Safe-
ty Authority (EFSA) repeatedly ascertained 
that genetically modified food poses no 
risks to consumer health. 
In 2009, the United States registered a 
dispute about poultry carcasses treated 
with certain chemicals; the dispute is on 
hold right now. The complaint refers to a 
1997 EU ban on American poultry that had 
been decontaminated with chlorine; the 
EU permits only poultry that is treated with 
water and cooling. The EFSA again could 
not find any risks to consumer health. 
Regulatory Tradition in the EU Depends 
on Partner Country and Product 
In sum, the EU has concluded more than 
770 international agreements concerning 
trade in agriculture. These agreements range 
from all-encompassing agreements to very 
specific ones concerning only one product. 
The EU has longstanding experience 
with harmonization and mutual equiva-
lence, which also lies at the heart of the 
European Common Market. Approaches 
differ by partner country and product. 
(1) Gradual harmonization. For EU acces-
sion candidates, full harmonization is 
required. Countries aspiring to become EU 
member states need to adopt all EU stand-
ards and regulatory systems (“acquis com-
munautaire”). In the case of free trade 
agreements and customs unions with third 
countries, agricultural tariffs are not often 
covered. Nevertheless, the adoption of EU 
standards is often aimed at. For example, 
the EFTA states of Norway, Liechtenstein, 
and Iceland do not face complete liberali-
zation for food and fish. But on the acquis 
they decided jointly on those areas to be 
adopted. The national regulatory agencies 
of Norway and Iceland are to cooperate 
closely with the EFSA, in which they also 
enjoy observer status. The Ankara Agree-
ment with Turkey only lowers tariffs for a 
limited amount of processed agricultural 
products, whereas food standards are not 
included at all. Hence, EU standards apply 
for Turkish goods exported to the EU. 
(2) Flexible equivalence. The mutual recog-
nition of equivalence is the most common 
form of cooperation and can again take 
various forms and shapes. The bilateral 
agricultural agreement with Switzerland 
envisages the individual mutual recogni-
tion of veterinary standards and relies on 
positive lists. With the new European Model 
of Deep and Comprehensive Trade Agree-
ments (DCFTAs), the EU aims to specifically 
tackle NTMs in neighboring countries. This 
reveals that there are special difficulties in 
the agricultural sector. Yet, adjusting the 
Mediterranean Association Agreements 
to the DCFTA model could only be started 
with a few partners. Negotiations with 
Morocco have been ongoing since spring 
2013. Preparatory dialogues are currently 
being held with Jordan, Tunisia, and Egypt. 
The EU approach to standards in agree-
ments with countries that are further 
away is much different: only a few product-
specific agreements define what is con-
sidered equivalent in positive lists. The 
degree of equivalence ranges from full 
recognition to conditional recognition 
until complete refusal, and hence, exclu-
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Figure 1 
Flexible equivalence in EU Veterinary Equivalence Treaties (VET) and CETA  
(number of contained regulations) 
 
sion of equivalence. The agreements on 
veterinary standards between the EU and 
the United States, Canada, and New Zea-
land define different degrees of equivalence 
only for different standards on animal 
products (Figure 1). Once they are com-
pleted, comprehensive trade agreements 
usually replace previous equivalence ar-
rangements. Currently, the EU is negotiat-
ing Economic Partnership Agreements with 
the African Caribbean and Pacific states. 
Here again, standards play a decisive role 
in terms of market access to the EU – elimi-
nation of full tariffs is useless if market 
access is denied because standards are 
not met. Only a few agreements (EU–Pacific,  
EU–CARIFORUM) address full mutual rec-
ognition. Most often they are about the part-
ners’ compliance with EU standards, for 
which the EU offers aid for implementation. 
(3) Special rules for organic products. The 
import rules for organic products comprise 
a whole range of cooperation methods: the 
EU recognizes competent regulatory con-
trol bodies in third countries to verify the 
equivalence of individual products with EU 
rules. This is again cross-checked through 
EU controls. Simpler rules apply to all 
organic products of a country if the whole 
production process is considered to be 
equivalent. Hence, product-specific veryfi-
cation is not required anymore. In 2012, 
there were 11 countries that were included 
in this category, among them the United 
States, Canada, Australia, Israel, Tunisia, 
and India. With some of those countries, 
the EU concludes individual organic equiva-
lence agreements, for instance with the 
United States (2012), Canada (2011), Switzer-
land (2008), and Japan (2010). These agree-
ments further facilitate the EU’s importing 
of organic products because additional EU 
controls cease to apply. 
(4) Institutionalized cooperation. Recent 
trade agreements contain procedural pro-
visions about common decisions on equiva-
lence between the contracting states: the 
EU agreements with Korea, Chile, and Peru/ 
Colombia integrate joint SPS committees. 
The EU-Korea agreement and the Compre-
hensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(CETA) with Canada include additionally 
the aim to cooperate in matters of animal 
protection, which is a novelty in trade 
agreements without any binding inter-
national standards. Moreover, CETA also 
contains a higher-ranking regulatory co-
operation council in addition to a specific 
SPS body covering all sectors. 
Transatlantic Differences 
Food standards in the EU and the United 
States differ in many respects (Table 1). On 
the one hand, there are differences in terms 
of requirements for production processes, 
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Table 1 
Transatlantic regulatory differences:  
Procedural rules and risk tolerance ( banned, √ permitted) 
 EU US WTO case 
Procedural rules    
 For genetically modified food    
 _public license registry √ Non-existent  
 For animal and plant epidemics    
 _regionalization approach Region often differentiated  Region often the state  
 _Escherichia-coli test for crustacean 
animals 
In animal meat In the water  
Principles on risk tolerance    
 For genetically modified food    
 _approval √ EU-wide 
 by member state 
√ EU convicted 
 _labeling requirement √ If content > 0.9% –  
 For meat    
 _Decontamination    
 ... with chlorine   √ Still no decision 
 … with lactic acid √ √  
 _Use of hormones/beta-blockers     
 … as performance enhancer  √ EU convicted 
 … veterinary use √ √  
 _Use of antibiotics    
 … as performance enhancer  √  
 … veterinary use √ √  
 … veterinary use in organic farming √   
 For cloning    
 _marketing of food products √ New proposal for ban in 
legislation process 
√  
 _labeling requirement – –  
 For milk    
 _raw milk product marketing √   
 _use of performance enhancer  
(bovines, somatotropin) 
 √  
 
 
e.g., detecting animal epidemics (procedural 
rules). On the other hand, there are differ-
ences in terms of the principles on the 
levels of risk (risk tolerance). 
Guiding Principles: 
EU Precautionary, US After-caring 
The guiding principle of the EU is the pre-
cautionary principle. Accordingly, there is a 
duty to protect the population if companies 
cannot prove that used substances or pro-
cedures are harmless. On the contrary, the 
guiding principle of the United States is 
the after-care principle. Here, the public 
administration first has to prove a harmful 
effect of a product before it can enact a ban. 
This risk-based approach, which comes close 
to the approach of the WTO, is further aug-
mented by the legal liability tradition in 
the United States to compensate for damages 
once they occur. New substances and prod-
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ucts are banned more often in the EU as 
compared to the United States. These bans 
lead to levels that are stricter than inter-
national thresholds, which usually allow 
for limited levels of residue. Therefore, EU 
standards are more likely to be attacked by 
the WTO and need to be justified through 
risk assessments. In cases where the United 
States places a ban on a product (e.g., raw 
milk product marketing), there are often 
no international reference standards that 
can serve as the basis for a complaint at 
the WTO. 
Focus:  
Procedures (EU) vs. Final Product (US) 
The regulatory focus of the EU is generally 
on the whole production process rather 
than on the final product. This approach 
means high-level requirements for every 
production step. For instance, the germ 
load of meat should be minimized through 
continuous hygiene that starts at the farm 
and ends on the plate of the consumer 
(“farm to fork”). This also entails measures 
that enable backtracking, such as identifi-
cation chips for animals, but also detailed 
documentation duties across all production 
stages. The United States focuses more on 
the final product, for example, by using 
chlorine to eliminate all germs at the end 
of the production. 
Decision-making Procedures: 
EU More Political, US More Risk-based 
Transatlantic regulatory differences are 
caused by differences in internal decision-
making procedures. Since the bovine 
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, or “mad 
cow”) crisis, risk management and risk 
assessment have been institutionally split 
in the EU. The EFSA reviews the risk assess-
ments brought forward by national agencies 
or enterprises. For the subsequent political 
decision on approval, the European Com-
mission, the European Council, and the 
European Parliament are involved. Often 
the decision is to not follow the risk assess-
ment of the EFSA – for instance, in the case 
of GMOs or the chlorine decontamination 
of carcasses. Decisions concerning rather 
technical aspects come in the form of so-
called delegated acts, for which the Euro-
pean Parliament and member states have 
less say than the Commission. Among these 
technical aspects are the use of GMOs and 
additives. The old EU veterinary agreements 
with Canada and the United States even 
passed via Council decisions, which com-
pletely excluded the European Parliament 
and the national parliaments, contrary to 
the recent trade agreements CETA and the 
TTIP. 
In the United States, such an institution-
al split between risk assessment and risk 
management does not exist, but different 
jurisdictions according to product types 
do exist. This more integrative approach 
may explain the higher level of coherence 
between risk assessment and risk manage-
ment – political decisions about product 
approval usually follow the risk assessment. 
Tips for the TTIP When Considering 
Regulatory Differences 
(1) Equivalence for procedural rules: 
definition of epidemics and bacterial 
testing 
A harmonization of procedural measures 
becomes possible if they are based on simi-
lar perceptions of risks and, hence, aim for 
a similar level of protection. 
 Flexible equivalence. Since September 26, 
2014, the consolidated version of CETA 
has been publicly available. This allows for 
tracing the replacement of the previous 
veterinary agreement (VET) (Figure 1 above). 
Although the number of regulations ad-
dressed by the EU decreased from 108 (VET) 
to 75 (CETA), the number of fully equivalent 
regulations increased from 3 to 7. Canada 
still only accepts 3 regulations as being 
equivalent. Both sides exclude a number 
of regulations from equivalence (the EU 12 
and Canada 10). Most of the regulations 
require additional conditions. One can en-
vision similar flexibility for the TTIP, which 
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will replace the existing veterinary agree-
ment. 
 Common decision-making procedures within 
the “living agreement.” The TTIP also envisages 
a general regulatory cooperation council 
and an SPS committee similar to CETA. 
Although the SPS forum is supposed to be 
responsible for the implementation of 
current bilateral equivalence decisions, the 
regulatory cooperation council will enable 
ongoing dialogue about measures that are 
not part of the agreement yet. This would 
affect plant regulations. A balanced com-
position of the regulatory council is crucial: 
besides including representatives from the 
industry, it should also include representa-
tives from civil society, as recommended 
by CETA. This would incorporate not only 
effects on health and trade but also include 
consumer interests. CETA also stresses the 
involvement of third states, which should 
also be emphasized in the TTIP. 
 
(2) Market approach or keeping own 
standards for diverging risk tolerance: 
performance enhancers, GMOs, and 
decontamination 
If there are conflicts about how to assess 
risks and what risks to accept, a mutually 
agreeable equivalence is not feasible. How-
ever, this does not mean that the interests 
of only one actor will necessarily prevail. 
 Keeping standards and packaging. After the 
decade-long dispute about hormones in 
beef, the solution constituted a win-win 
situation. The EU was able to stick to its 
standards and grant tariff concessions. 
Canada and the United States enjoyed tariff-
free market entry for a certain amount 
of beef, which would otherwise have faced 
high tariffs. 
Because of the prevailing chlorine ban in 
the EU, only about 200 tons of US poultry 
could be exported to the EU in 2013. There 
is a quota for lower tariffs, which is rarely 
exploited. Further decreases in tariffs – up 
to duty-free – could be an incentive for the 
United States to produce more chlorine-free 
poultry. This could happen due to the fact 
that increases in export returns help to 
better cover the higher production costs 
of hormone-free beef. Such tariff incentives 
could also be a possible solution for other 
performance enhancers (somatotropin 
in milk production, beta-blockers in pig 
fattening) that are banned in the EU. 
 Private labeling. Some WTO disputes 
indicate that divergences could be solved 
through private labeling. The United States 
was convicted by the WTO when it stopped 
importing Mexican tuna that had been 
fished using techniques that endangered 
dolphins. The result of retailers introducing 
the “dolphin-friendly tuna” label was 
that the US technique prevailed on the US 
market, all without any legal obligations, 
because consumers refused any other types 
of tuna. However, labels can also have trade-
distorting effects and can be addressed 
through WTO dispute mechanisms: the 
United States is being accused due to the 
labeling it uses to indicate the origins of 
beef, as it is perceived to constitute a dis-
advantage to Canadian importers. 
An EU-wide obligation to label products 
treated with GMOs or chlorine could also 
be vulnerable if it had discriminatory 
effects on trade. But private labeling could 
be a solution because only states can be 
sued in front of the WTO appellate body. 
A culture of openness and transparency 
is necessary to solve the dispute 
Although differences in procedures and 
risk assessment between the EU and the 
United States are obvious, existing agree-
ments show some approaches for resolving 
disputes in the TTIP negotiations. These 
approaches constitute viable alternatives 
to the feared automatic harmonization of 
standards. 
Just keeping own standards is also an 
option. Retaining own standards implies 
abstaining from possible welfare-increasing 
effects due to enhanced trade under the 
TTIP. However, retaining standards would 
also have positive effects. First, it would 
reduce externality costs that are not usually 
covered by risk assessments such as health 
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or environmental effects, which are not 
tested automatically. Methods for risk 
assessments and experts’ decisions on what 
to test for are constantly changing anyway. 
That means other risks will be contained in 
risk assessments in the future and may lead 
to different political decisions than those 
being made today. Second, retaining own 
standards may result in the political benefit 
of protecting the consumer. Consumers’ 
confidence is based on subjective percep-
tions, regardless of any scientific risk assess-
ment. That is why the WTO does not con-
sider this argument to be a crucial factor in 
political decision-making as it can become 
arbitrary. But risk perceptions – and even 
risk assessments – always will be subjective 
and influenced by socio-cultural processes 
that may differ across countries. Therefore, 
conflicts between states will continue. This 
stresses the importance of openness and 
transparency in such conflicts, which will 
appear anyhow. Opening the regulatory 
council to civil society groups should be 
implemented and also be envisaged for the 
TTIP. 
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